† This paper is based on a talk that I was very pleased to give at the conference Reflections, December 13-15, 1998 , in honor of Solomon Feferman on his seventieth birthday. The choice of topic is especially appropriate for the conference in view of recent discussions we had had about finitism. I profited from the discussion following my talk and, in particular, from the remarks of Richard Zach. I have since had the advantage of further discussions with Zach and of reading his paper 1998; and I use his scholarship here shamelessly for my own purposes. Finally, I want to thank the two anonymous referees of this paper, whose comments have led to several changes in the final version.
1 See [22, §3.4 ] for a discussion of Bernays contribution to the conception of finitism.
I have sofar done; but I won't take it up here. The point I want to emphasize now is that I don't see in this notion of formal object the means for reasoning about the totality of numbers. My argument, which I don't want to repeat or expand upon here, is that the idea of iteration, which is of the essence of the idea of number and, in particular, is the means by which numerical functions are defined and numerical equations are proved, is not found or represented in intuition but is a creature of reason. That we may define a function by primitive recursion on a numerical variable is not a consequence of the representability of numbers in intuition, but rather follows from what we mean by (finite) iteration. I attempted to answer the first, conceptual, question by taking seriously the notion of an arbitrary or generic object X of a given finitist type, where a finitist type of the first kind is a product N × · · · × N, N being the type of the natural numbers, and a finitist type of the second kind is a product whose factors are numerical equations m = n. An objct of the latter type, if there is any, consists of a proof of each of the factors m = n from the axiom 0 = 0 using the inference a = b ⇒ a = b . My argument is that one can understand the idea of an arbitrary object of a given finitist type independently of that of the totality of objects of that type; and on its basis, we may proceed to construct objects of possibly other finitist types, which may depend on X. Thus, when X is of finitist type of the first kind, we may construct from it other objects f (X) of types of the first kind. I claimed that, when we identify just what means of construction from X are implicit in the idea of such an arbitrary object, they turn out to be precisely those by means of which we define the primitive recursive functions. Likewise, when we identify, for given finitist functions f (X) and g (X) , what constructions of a proof of f (X) = g(X) are implicit in the idea of an arbitrary X, they turn out to yield proofs of exactly those equations deducible in P RA.
Concerning the conceptual question, some doubts have been raised about the identification of finitism with P RA. For example, Kreisel [20] takes finitism to include quantifier-free induction up to any ordinal below 0 and Ignjatović [18, p. 323] writes that my analysis of finitistic reasoning is not beyond any doubt. I have criticized Kreisel's conception in [28] . In footnote 5 (p. 323) Ignjatović writes: "Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that any basis sufficient to justify what is formalized in (PRA) and which satisfies some necessary closure properties in order to be acceptable as an epistemologically distinguished system of methods, is also sufficient to justify 0 -induction." But the basis on which [28] derived P RA is the finitist types; the claim is that, to go beyond P RA requires the introduction of higher types, e.g. of numerical functions and proofs. One would think that this restriction on the types of objects admitted would satisfy the condition of being "an epistemologically distinguished system of methods". Regarding Gödel's position(s) on the conceptual question, the evidence is not entirely sraightforward. In [4, p. 198] , he explicitly denies that his incompleteness theorems undermine Hilbert's attempt to obtain finitary consistency proofs, and it seems reasonably clear that he is referring to the conceptual rather than the historical question of the meaning of finitism.
2 In view of this, it would seem that he was open at that time to the possibility that finitism extends beyond P RA. On the other hand, in his notes for lectures in 1933 [5] and in 1938 [6] , he explicitly attributes to Hilbert the aim of establishing consistency in P RA. Moreover, in the first of these he refers to P RA as the first in an ascending series of layers of intuitionistic or constructive mathematics [11, p. 51] and, in the second, he refers to it as finitary number theory, the lowest level of a hierarchy of finitist systems [11, p. 93] . In [7, p. 281] , however, he refers to Hilbert's definition of finitism as "the mathematics in which evidence rests on what is intuitive" and so rejects as finitist in this sense the higher levels of "finitist systems", such as intuitionism and his own system T of primitive recursive functions of finite type.
Kreisel [21, p. 506] accepts the identification of finitism (at least as it is described in the beginning of [16] ) with P RA, but doubts my argument for it. He writes of [27] that "its central point seems to be that the evidence of each proof has, in some essential way, a strictly finite character. As it stands the analysis . . . is unconvincing since the understanding of any one rule goes beyond this." I would not like to talk about the evidence of a proof, but simply of the proof (i.e. evidence for the proposition). The 'some essential way' in which the proof f (X) has a finite character is that it appeals only to what is implicit in the idea of an arbitrary object X of the given finitist type N×· · ·×N and does not appeal to higher types of objects, such as numerical functions, proofs, etc. Whether or not this gives the proof a strictly finite character, it does seem to me to provide a sense in which we can say that certain numerical functions or proofs of equations, which apply to an infinite number of objects, are finite. It is certainly true that if we finitistically construct f (X) from an arbitrary number X, then the construction applies to obtain f (0), f(1), etc.-and, if we understand the former, then presumably we understand f (n) for each given n. But that is not to say that the validity of the construction f (X) or our understanding of it depends on the validity or our understanding of each of the infinite number of instances of it.
Of course, an analysis of the notion of finitism cannot be presented as a theorem. It is, rather, analogous to Turing's analysis of the notion of a computable real: at one end is an intuitive notion and at the other, its explication in terms of a precise mathematical concept. There are however at least two crucial differences between Turing's analysis and the analysis of the notion of finiteness. The most prominent difference concerns the relative importance of the notions; the other difference is that Turing's analysis has stood up over a long period of time.
3 Far too little attention has been paid to the explication of the idea of finitism for one to feel that my analysis is beyond doubt. But sofar I have seen no serious discussion of it; and so I'm not going to discuss this question further now.
Concerning the second, historical, sense of the question "What is finitism?", there has been some serious discussion: I mention in particular Zach's paper [31] . Hilbert nowhere gives a precise characterization of what he means by this; and, indeed, in [16] the authors, in discussing the extent to which finitist methods include the principles formalized in first-order arithmetic (P A), write
To be sure, even as we have formulated it, this question is not precise; for we have not introduced the expression "finit" as a sharply delimited term, but only as a designation of a methodological guideline which, to be sure, enables us to definitively recognize certain kinds of concept formations and inferences as finitist, certain others as not finitist, but which provides no precise dividing line between those which satisfy the demands of finitist methods and those which do not. [16, p. 361] However, there is general agreement, well supported by Hilbert's own writings, that he regarded the kinds of concept formation and inferences formalized in primitive recursive arithmetic (P RA) as finitist. 4 The substantive issue seems to be whether he was committed to there being concepts and modes of inference which are not formalizable in P RA. I will confine my attention to this question.
There are four sources of data relevant or at least thought to be relevant to the issue: various passages in the two volumes of Grundlagen der Mathematik [16, 17] , the reference to Ackermann's function in "Über das Unendliche" [12] and Hilbert's so-called 'ω-rule' in "Grundlegung der elementaren Zahlenlehre" [14].
Grundlagen I
Zach mentions one passage in §7 of Volume I which he takes as evidence for the view that the authors took finitism to be more extensive than P RA.
We The distinction of recursive number theory from intuitive number theory consists in its formal constraints; its only method of concept formation, aside from explicit definition, is the schema of recursion, and also the methods of deduction are strictly circumscribed. In view of this, I am inclined to take "what is characteristic of" its method to be the kind of definitions (recursion equations) and rules of inference (freevariable induction principles) that are involved. Just preceding the above passages, the authors state explicitly that recursive number theory, as it had been developed up to that point, is finitistically valid. Insofar as they can be reduced to P RA, this would then be so of what can be obtained by the various principles of definition and proof that they subsequently introduce in §7. However, nothing they write points clearly to an acceptance of the diagonal function or the Ackermann function as finitist. On the other hand, they don't explicitly reject them as finitist, either.
Grundlagen II
There is no doubt that in Volume II there is evidence that the authors regarded finitism as extending beyond P RA. Thus, Zach quotes a passage referring back to the passage just quoted from Volume I, in which they write Certain methods of finitist mathematics which go beyond recursive number theory (in the original sense) have been discussed already in §7 [of [16] ], namely the introduction of functions by nested recursion and the more general induction schema. [17, p.
( 354)]
But the question is whether or not this reflects their view of finitism in earlier writings, up to the publication of Volume I, which were unaffected either by Gödel's incompleteness theorems or by the Gentzen's success in proof theory using methods that go beyond P RA. Already in his introduction to [16] , written in March 1934, after the completion of the text, in response to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, Hilbert spoke of the necessity for using the finitist standpoint in a sharper (schärferen) way than was required for the treatment of elementary formalisms. This would seem to indicate that he had in mind some resource that he regarded to be already contained in the finitist conception, rather than some more extensive conception, going beyond finitism. On the other hand, in the Introduction to Volume II, Bernays, in reference to the new methods needed to prove the consistency of less elementary formalisms such as P A, speaks of an extension of the finitist standpoint. I don't know whether this form of expression constitutes a recognition that these new methods go beyond finitism as originally conceived or whether, like Hilbert, he is refering to new resources contained within the original conception.
Further complicating the issue, on p. 224 the authors write about "contentual finite number theory, which", they say, "indeed is formalized through recursive number theory"; and here they refer back to Volume I. This would seem to contradict the later statement, quoted above, that finitism has no precise boundary; however they go on to write that This would seem to leave the boundary of finitism, as conceived in Volume I, indeterminate without commiting it to more than P RA.
But we also see here the expression "the original narrow concept of a finitist proposition", suggesting a wider conception that is still, on their view, finitist. Indeed, they go on to discuss certain propositions (e.g. implications with universal antecedents) the employment of which "appears not to be a violation of the basic ideas of the methodology (methodischen Grundgedanken) of finitist proof theory." In fact, they suggest that, having taken this step, one can extend the methods of finitist proof theory even further.
Certainly, from my own point of view, this amounts to a clear transgression of finitist mathematics, which admits as a limiting case, only, proofs of statements Zach does quote from a letter from Bernays to Gödel from 1970: These nested recursions . . . appear to me to be finite in the same sense as the primitive recursions, i.e., if one regards them as statements of computation procedures where one can recognize that the function defined by the respective process satisfies the recursion equations (for every system of numerical values for the arguments). Indeed, the computation of the value of a function according to a nested recursion, when the numerical values of the arguments are given, comes down to the application of several primitive recursions, the number of which is determined by a numerical argument. But one should note, certainly with admiration but also as a caution, that Bernays wrote this in a letter when he was 82 years old. And, in any case, his reasoning here is defective. To understand his point about the computation of the Ackerman function f (x, y) amounting to the computation of x primitive recursive functions of y, let f (x, y) instead be the enumeration f x (y) of the primitive recursive functions of y mentioned above. Now, it is true that, for any particular number m, we can construct 
7Ü ber das Unendliche
My original foray into history concerned a reference to the Ackermann function by Hilbert in [12] , which Kreisel cites in [21, fn 42, p. 514] as evidence against my thesis that finitism is P RA. I responded to this in [28] ; but the matter seems not to be entirely laid to rest. So let me expand on it and convince you that this issue is not at all open! In his paper, Hilbert wanted to sketch, as an application of his proof theory, a proof of the continuum hypothesis CH, and a key to understanding what he intends is to remember that his proof theory involved formalizationj in the -calculus and then proving the eliminability of all -terms. He assumed that a certain formal system Σ, in which CH can be formulated, is complete; and so it sufficed to prove that ¬CH cannot be derived in Σ. Σ is a many-sorted theory containing the types N of the second number class and Z of the first number class. The negation of CH can be expressed by
(To improve readability, I am using arrows and exponentiation interchangeably.) Using -symbols, this takes the form
where t = t(F ) is a term for a numerical function, built up by means of the -operator from F . He now invokes his Lemma I, which he states to be a conseqence of his general principle that every mathematical problem can be solved: If a proof of a proposition contradicting the continuum theorem is given in a formalized version with the aid of functions defined by means of the transfinite symbol . . . , then in this proof these functions can always be replaced by functions defined, without the use of the symbol , by means merely of ordinary and transfinite recursion . . . . Call the functions obtained by impredicative primitive recursion relative to this hierarchy N − P R. So, t(F ) is an N − P R function of F . Now we may define another hierarchy Z α | α ∈ N , where Z 0 = Z, obtaining also the class of Z − P R functions. 9 The class of Z − P R functions has the power of N and so we can take F to be an enumeration of all the Z − P R numerical functions, itself defined by recursion on N . So t = t(F ) is a N − P R numerical function. Hilbert gives an argument to show that any N − P R numerical function and, in particular, t is Z − P R and hence in the range of the enumeration F -a contradiction.
Hilbert goes on to say that, even aside from the holes in the argument that need filling, the proof would require "a recasting strictly faithful to the finitist attitude". Clearly what he has in mind is the formalization Σ of the theory of the second number class N , including the theories of the N − P R and Z − P R functions, and the translation of the proof of ¬CH in the -calculus into a proof in Σ of a contradiction. Since he presumably believed that a finitist proof of the consistency of Σ could be obtained, he could conclude that there can be no proof of ¬CH and, hence, by completeness, CH is true.
Hilbert's so-called ω-Rule
There is also a prevailing confusion concerning Hilbert's paper "Die Grundlegung der elementaren Zahlenlehre" [14] , in which he proposes the following "Schlussregel":
If it is proved that the formula A(z) is a true numerical formula for each given numeral z, then the formula ∀xA(x) may be admitted as an initial formula. Gödel reviewed this paper and, in the introductory note to the review in [9] , Feferman discusses the question of whether or not Hilbert was here reacting to Gödel's incompleteness theorems. But, more to the point, he notes that the principle in question is mis-named the ω-rule. In the first place, the formula A(x) is to be quantifier-free; in fact, it is to be the formalization of a finitistically meaningful property of numbers. But, secondly, in spite of Hilbert calling it a "Schlussregel", it is not even a restricted case of the ω-rule. Rather, it provides a criterion under which the universal formula ∀xA(x) may be taken as an initial formula-i.e. an axiom in a deduction. Hilbert is describing a system Σ, which is obtained from the formal system of elementary number theory, with definition by primitive recursion included, by admitting such axioms. Of course, Σ is not itself a formal system-unless we accept the thesis that finitism = P RA or some other formal system. But it is misleading to call it a quasi-formal system, at least as that term was introduced by Schütte for deductions admitting the ω-rule. One might note also that it is precisely this system Σ which Gentzen described in [3] and to which he applied his consistency proof.
Conclusion
Sofar, on the evidence I have seen, I remain inclined towards the view that there was no commitment to finitist principles that go beyond P RA in Volume I or in earlier writings. In Volume II, by their own admission, the authors are including more under the term "finitist" than was originally included. Perhaps further evidence will settle the historical question decisively. 
